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The problem of cultural difference, 
combined with the notion of lifeworld, is to 
be inquired phenomenologically in this 
research. The central question is raised as 
follows: is cultural difference the result of 
differences between lifeworlds or 
conversely the explication of cultural 
difference depends upon the lifeworld that 
is common to all? Different ways of 
understanding the lifeworld notion result in 
different conceptions of cultural difference. 
In phenomenology Husserl and Schutz 
represent these two different positions 
respectively. My research aims at 
clarifying the relationship between 
lifeworld and cultural difference primarily 
according to Husserl, Schutz, their critics 
and reflections on them, whereby I will 
stress the idea of grounding (die 
Grundlegungsidee) as clue to my 
investigation. 
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(die Idee der Grundlegung）所支配。
    所謂的「奠基理念」是由當代德國學
者 Bernhard Waldenfels所提出的，「奠基」
意指「回溯到最終基礎或最後原因」
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    本人此次所發表的論文就是本年度
研究的成果。在 “The Socio-Ontological 
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That there exist different cultures in the 
world is an indisputable fact. Relating this 
fact to the phenomenological concept of 
lifeworld we might raise two questions: Do 
we live in the same lifeworld despite 
cultural difference? Or else, do we live in 
different lifeworlds because of cultural 
difference? The first question implies the 
singularity of the lifeworld, whereas in the 
second question the lifeworld can be 
lifeworld only in the plural. How is cultural 
difference related to the lifeworld after all? 
For Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the 
founder of phenomenology, the lifeworld 
seems to be conceived of as the bare 
ground of the natural sciences and 
therefore valid for all mankind regardless 
of cultural differences. In contrast, for 
Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), who is more 
concerned with the foundation of human 
and social sciences than that of natural 
sciences, the lifeworld involves cultural 
difference because he comprehends 
lifeworld as the field of praxis with social 
and cultural characteristics. 
    In the following I will inquire into the 
problem of the lifeworld and cultural 
difference in the context of Husserl’s as 
well as Schutz’s theories especially with 
regard to the idea of grounding 
(Grundlegungsidee) with which Bernhard 
Waldenfels (1934- ) criticizes Husserl’s 
lifeworld theory. (Waldenfels: 1985) My 
point of view is that in spite of the apparent 
difference between Husserl and Schutz 
they are both affected by the idea of 
grounding. I inquire into the consequences 
of the rejection of this idea in relation to 
the problematic of the lifeworld and 
cultural difference and in the end I reflect 
on the meaning of universality in the 
context of cultural difference.
I
The lifeworld is, in the transcendental 
8approach of Husserl, not the object of 
direct description, but something that has 
to be gained back by way of “asking back” 
(Rückfrage). This “asking back” has, 
according to Waldenfels, three goal
1. the grounding of the sciences in the 
lifeworld and the overcoming of the 
objectivism stemming from the natural 
sciences developed in the modern age;
2. the opening to transcendental 
phenomenology from the lifeworld, 
which is subjective-relative; 
3. the acquiring of an encompassing 
perspective on different historical worlds, 
because all such worlds presuppose the 
one lifeworld.
The lifeworld thus fulfills three functions: 
the grounding function (Bodenfunktion), 
the guiding function (Leitfadenfunktion), 
and the uniting function 
(Einigungsfuktion). 
    But how is the lifeworld to be 
understood with respect to content?
    Husserl has offered three versions of 
the lifeworld in the Krisis :a) the concrete 
lifeworld; b) a relative specific world such 
as vocational world or a certain cultural 
world; 3) a world-nucleus of nature to be 
distilled by abstraction, namely, the world 
of straitforward intersubjective perception. 
In his eyes only the third version can fulfill 
the three functions mentioned above. This 
world is composed of the world of 
space-time and natural objects, which are 
not yet culturally interpreted and 
reconstructed. Thus understood, this world 
represents that which remains the same for 
everyone despite cultural differences of 
whatever kind. Waldenfels stresses that this 
world is, on the one hand, given first 
(erstgeben) in the bare perceptual presence 
and on the other hand, functions as 
regulating principle (letztregelnd) in the 
universal structuration. As “given first,” it 
is the ground of all meaning-constructions 
(Sinnbildung). As regulating principle, it is 
the horizon of all meaning constructions.1
                                                
1 Niklas Luhman treats this combination of ground 
and horizon as incompatible and confusing: 
“Einerseits heißt es, die Welt sei ein Horizont, 
eventuell Horizont aller Horizonte. Anderseits wird 
die Lebenswelt als der Boden beschrieben, auf dem 
    Accordingly, the lifeworld 
comprehended as ground means the ground 
of meaning constructs of higher levels; in 
particular those in the objective natural 
sciences, whereas the lifeworld understood 
as horizon means that from which we are 
conscious of something as given. It is 
namely the pre-given condition for the 
appearance of things. 
    So far as horizon is concerned, some 
explications need to be added. When we 
understand the horizon to be the pre-given 
condition for the appearance of things, this 
does not mean that it is background. A 
background is something that might turn to 
be the theme of our consciousness, 
whereas the horizon can never become 
definite or thematic. The horizon escapes 
so to speak substantial thematization. In 
this respect, the horizon is beyond the 
background. It is indeterminate. But 
indeterminacy does not mean infinity, 
because infinity can be applied to 
something which can itself become 
thematic, whereas indeterminacy can not. 
The world-infinity, Husserl contends, is 
peculiar to the “astronomical-physicalistic” 
infinity, i.e., the infinity of endlessness. 
Such conception of horizon does not apply 
to the horizon that Husserl understands to 
be the lifeworld. The lifeworld as horizon 
is indeterminate only in the sense that it is 
open to new possibilities. Certainly new 
possibilities happen only in a certain frame 
or a “leeway” (Spielraum), which can 
never be expanded endlessly.              
    Understood as horizon and as ground, 
the lifeworld is regarded as the 
indispensable foundation of the constructs 
in the science, those in the positivistic 
natural sciences. Besides, the lifeworld is 
understood primarily as the world of 
perception, which reveals itself as the 
common ground of all possible human 
experiences, or put in a different way, it 
                                                                      
alles Beobachten und Handeln bewegt. Aber ein 
Horizont ist kein Boden. Auf einem Horizont kann 
man nicht stehen. Man kann sich auf ihn bewegen, 
nicht aber sich auf ihm bewegen.” Luhmann finds 
that both terms of ground (Boden) and horizon 
(Horizont) are metaphorical and “[d]as Unglück ist, 
daß Husserls Metaphern einander widersprechen.” 
(Luhman 1986:177)  
9goes beyond the boundaries of cultural 
differences. Husserl's conception of 
lifeworld is obviously guided by the idea 
of grounding.
    Some recent discussions of Husserl’s 
notions of homeworld (Heimwelt) and 
alienworld (Fremdwelt) have shed new 
light on his conception of the relation 
between lifeworld and cultural difference. 
The notion of homeworld, scattered around 
in Intersubjektivität Band III (Husserliana 
XV), indicates the normal lifeworld of the 
“homecomrades.” The normality is the 
result of tradition, which formulates itself 
from generation to generation. Generativity 
(Generativität) is the key notion in the 
Husserlian descriptions both of homeworld 
and alienworld. The alienworld is thus 
understood as the world with which the 
homecomrades have no common tradition, 
i.e., no common forerunners through 
generations (Hua XV: 431f.). Since 
tradition and history shape cultural 
characteristics, the difference between 
homeworld and alienworld can be viewed 
as the difference in culture.
    One question can be raised in this 
context: Is cultural difference to be 
surpassed? Husserl seems to be optimistic 
by introducing the idea of the one world 
(die eine Welt). According to Klaus Held's 
interpretation this “one world” is 
constituted in the same way as the 
intersubjectivity clarified in the Cartesian 
Meditations V.  Just as the other subject 
(alter ego) is to be recognized through his 
body, especially through the similarity of 
his body and mine, so is the forerunner of 
the other cultural world recognizable 
through the basic human phenomena such 
as birth and death. The experience of 
Generativity (Generativität) creates so to 
speak the bridge between culture and 
culture.2
                                                
2 Cf. Held 1991:323. Held stresses that the 
alienworld is that to which the homecomrades of a 
certain homeworld can not get access directly. Only 
through analogical association, in this case through 
urgenerativity, is the alienworld to be reached. In 
this sense, the homeworld is constitutive of the 
alienworld. Anthony Steinbock understands Husserl 
differently in this point. He holds that homeworld 
and alienworld are co-constitutive. (Steinbock 1995: 
Theoretically the relation between the 
one world and the different homeworlds is 
analogue to the identity pole (Identitätspol) 
of the intentional object and all its different 
perspectives (Abschattungen). Since the 
basis of the synthesis of the all the 
divergent perspectives lies in the identity 
pole of this object, so is the one world a 
"self" that functions among all different 
homeworlds. Besides, since the identity 
pole of an intentional object is an idea, 
which can be reached only by way of 
idealization, so is the one world also an 
idea.3    
Historically, the world as an idea 
appeared first in the thought of the ancient 
Greece. The philosophy and science of that 
time provides the institution (Urstiftung) to 
pursue the one world as an idea. This idea 
has strongly influenced modern Europe 
and this one world has unfolded itself at 
least partly in the modern age of world 
history. Thereby almost all human beings 
thus encounter a new comprehensive 
homeworld, which affords a frame of 
universally accepted norms and values.4
Even though this "new world" is still 
in process, for Husserl its full development 
is desirable. Understood in this sense, the 
difference between cultures is something 
we as human beings should endeavor to 
surpass and, accordingly, it is obvious that 
the problem of cultural difference has not 
really been a matter of concern to Husserl. 
Routinely he speaks for the universal 
ground for all different lifeworlds.  
                                                                      
179) I am not yet in a position to judge whether his 
interpretation is closer to Husserl than that of Held, 
But I find that his idea is similar to that of 
Waldenfels who speaks of "Verschränkung von 
Heimwelt und Fremdwelt". (Waldenfels 1993)
3 Hua XV: 181f.. In Held's interpretation, this one 
world remains a cultural homeworld in spite of its 
character of universality. It is one cultural world 
among many others. The consequence of this 
interpretation is that this universal world is both 
universal and concrete. This confusion of Husserl's
theory of lifeworld is also comparable to that 
resulting from his definition of lifeworld both as 
ground and horizon. (Luhman 1986: 177; also see 
footnote1)
4 Hua XV: 139; also see Held 1991: 324. The 
implication of "Eurocentrism" as a consequence of 
this idea of one world will be discussed later.
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II
In contrast to Husserl, Schutz integrates 
cultural difference as part of his lifeworld 
theory. The fact that he inherits the notion 
of lifeworld from Husserl does not mean 
that he has the same conception as Husserl 
from the beginning. Based on his concern 
to lay foundations for the social sciences, 
Schutz first conceives of the lifeworld as 
the world of praxis and sociality and then 
in his later writings due to his awareness of 
the significance of culture, he reformulates 
the lifeworld as the practical and 
social-cultural world. (Yu 1999) Since 
every lifeworld has its own particular 
culture, it follows that the lifeworlds are 
different from one another.
    With help of the Husserlian concept 
“appresentation” Schutz constructs a 
theory of lifeworld that involves culture 
and cultural difference. (CP I; see also Yu 
1996) Every experience in a lifeworld is 
for him based on the appresentational 
references; that is to say, people experience 
more than what they "purely experience." 
Let me clarify his viewpoint in a 
discussion between him and Aron 
Gurwitsch. 
After finishing the draft of "Symbol, 
Reality and Society" (later published in 
1952; see CP I), Schutz sent it to his close 
acquaintance Gurwitsch and received 
comments as follows:   
[I]n various places you say that a 
'thing' is transformed into a cultural 
object by appresentation. I am not so 
sure about that, although it is good 
Husserl…  Behind all of these 
theories is Husserl’s idea of a level of 
“pure experience” within the 
life-world, a level which is taken to 
be fundamental and on the basis of 
which other levels are built up. I 
have always had my doubts about 
this theory. If I take social-cultural 
objects, I understand how they can 
become “bodies” by means of 
unbuilding[Abbau] or some similar 
process; but I begin with bodies as 
the fundamental level, there are 
difficulties in getting to the cultural 
objects. (Schutz/Gurwitsch 1989: 
232)
     Gurwitsch does not mention the way 
a thing (ein Ding) becomes a cultural 
object by means of appresentation. But one 
can see obviously to what he refers. They 
are examples like the place where Jacob 
dreams of God becoming God’s house and 
an oven is more that just a fireplace, etc. 
(CP I: 337; 353) Gurwitsch wonders if 
such a conception of cultural objects might 
not remind us of that of Husserl? That is, 
does there exist at first the level of pure 
experience in the Lifeworld and then the 
Aufbau of the cultural object? In the eyes 
of Gurwitsch this is the way Husserl 
understands culture. For Husserl the pure 
experience in the Lifeworld is the 
perceptual experience of nature that is 
valid for all cultures. For example, the fact 
that marble is hard cannot be denied by 
whatever cultural interpretations. Such 
facts in perception are what Husserl calls 
the fundamental level of pure experience 
that is the ground of all different cultural 
experiences. Is the Schutzian conception of 
culture also to be understood in this way? 
Is there no difference between Schutz and 
Husserl, as Gurwitsch might suggest it?
     Since Gurwitsch is in doubt about 
the validity of the Husserlian notion of 
culture, he has doubts about Schutz’s 
notion too. For Gurwitsch the so-called 
fundamental level is not at all fundamental, 
rather it is the result of abstraction; only 
through Abbau from the cultural object 
might we see the grounding level. Schutz 
in his reply agrees with his colleague about 
this point. Nor will he accept the idea that 
there exists in the first place the pure 
experience and then the stage of culture. 
But he would not follow Gurwitsch when 
the latter tries to explain cultural 
phenomena with notions like Aufbau and 
Abbau. On the contrary he sees the crucial 
point in the social conditions within which 
a thing “becomes” a cultural object. With 
the examples of witchdoctors in the 
primitive societies and apparatus in the 
modern science he explains: "The contents 
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of the bag of a primitive witch doctor or a 
cyclotron is only considered to be a 
cultural object by the 'expert'." 
(Schütz/Gurwitsch 1989: 237) 
Whether a thing could be treated as a 
cultural object depends essentially on the 
social conditions. Only the members of the 
‘in-group” - be it a nation, a social level or 
just an interest-club - will be able to 
recognize the cultural meaning of 
something. They are the experts in this 
field, if we use “expert” in the broadest 
sense. Schutz says: “[E]ach of us has 
precise and distinct knowledge only about 
that particular field in which he is an expert. 
Among experts a certain technical 
knowledge is taken for granted, but exactly 
this technical knowledge is inaccessible to 
the layman.” (CP I: 350) For the people 
who do not belong to this group these 
things have no cultural meaning at all. If 
they want to understand it, then they have 
no other way than just learning, especially 
by a process of acculturation.5
According to Schutz it is beyond 
question that every cultural object involves 
material components, and hence can be 
viewed as a “normal object.” For example, 
is a holy stone not just a physical object, a 
church or a temple just a building? Yet a 
cultural object consists of something 
transcendent. The cultural elements of a 
cultural object seem to be just as natural as 
their physical components in the eyes of 
the "insider" of a social group. These 
components might seem bizarre in the eyes 
of the "outsider." The involved cultural 
meanings might be treated as relative, yet 
the relativity results only from the 
"outsider-viewpoint," that is, only if one 
refrains from recognizing these meanings 
as meanings. In contrast the “insiders” 
might treat their own value-system as 
absolute and anyone who does not or 
cannot share this system is seen to be a 
                                                
5 Schutz says: “… I have to learn the typical 
distribution of knowledge prevailing in this group, 
and this involves knowledge of the appresentational, 
referential and interpretative schemes… which each 
of the subgroups takes for granted and applies to its 
respective appresentational reference.”(CP I: 351)
stranger.6
     The problem of pure experience that 
Gurwitsch mentions should be located in 
the context of the cultural difference 
between in-group and out-group from the 
angle of Schutz. That is, it is a problem of 
sociocultural reality. Because Gurwitsch 
does not catch this point, is he unable to 
understand Schutz appropriately. I believe 
that Schutz himself should be responsible 
for this misunderstanding since he has not 
explained his points clearly enough in 
"Symbol, Reality and Society." As a matter 
of fact the pure experience of lifeworld in 
the sense of Husserl is not at all impossible 
from Schutz’s viewpoint. In the situation 
when people do not understand the cultural 
meaning of a thing, the pure experience of 
the lifeworld might turn up automatically. 
For example, a layman in art might wonder 
about what is expressed in an abstract 
painting and come to the conclusion that 
there appear nothing but certain lines, 
colors and shapes. The appresentational 
scheme on this occasion dose not function 
at all. In addition, according to Schutz we 
have to get acquainted with the necessary 
background if we wish to become capable 
of appreciating the works of art; 
acculturation is apparently required. 
     To sum up, Schutz rejects the pure 
experience of the lifeworld that 
transgresses cultural difference, as Husserl 
addresses it. Every experience in the 
lifeworld is loaded with cultural 
significance and every social-cultural 
group is necessarily segregated from alien 
groups by forming its own cultural norms. 
Every lifeworld is accordingly different 
from others because of cultural difference.
    But is Schutz exaggerating the 
difference between cultures? A careful 
reading reveals that he also speaks of some 
universal ideas almost in the tone of 
Husserl. He introduces the concept of 
“universal symbolism”, which he describes 
as follows:
  
Everywhere we find sex groups and 
                                                
6 Even the people who leave their homeland for all 
too long may also become stranger for the society 
in which they lived. (Cf. CP II: 106 f.)
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age groups, and some division of 
labor conditioned by them; and more 
or less rigid kinship organizations 
that arrange the social world into 
zones of varying social distance, 
from intimate familiarity to 
strangeness. Everywhere we also find 
hierarchies of superordination and 
subordination, of leader and follower, 
of those in command and those in 
submission…  There are everywhere, 
moreover, cultural objects, such as 
tools needed for the domination of 
the outer world, playthings for 
children, articles for adornment, 
musical instruments of some kind, 
objects serving as symbols for 
worship. (CP II: 229)
Evidently Schutz thinks that there exists 
universal cultural foundation in all human 
societies despite the cultural differences. 
This universal foundation is common to all 
sociocultural worlds because it is rooted in 
the human condition. (CP II: 229)
There is, so to speak, some confusion 
in Schutz’s articulation between lifeworld 
and cultural difference, because, on the one 
hand, he speaks emphatically of the 
importance of cultural difference for the 
lifeworld, on the other he appeals to some 
cultural universals. My contention is that 
this confusion stems from the idea of 
grounding of which he is not quite aware. 
Consequently he shares with Husserl the 
thought that there exists an universal 
foundation for all cultures, though for 
Husserl this may be characterized as 
perception, whereas for Schutz it is cultural 
universals.  
III
But why is the universal ground for all 
cultures necessary? Is this the inevitable 
consequence of the phenomenological 
inquiry, i.e., the search for eidetic essence? 
Waldenfels rejects this conception by 
questioning the legitimacy of the idea of 
grounding. He wonders how we can 
distinguish different orders as well as 
levels of meaning and compare them 
without taking up a certain position? As he 
puts it:
Selektive Ordnungen sind 
unvergleichbar in eienm radikalen 
Sinne: es fehlt uns der Ort, von dem 
aus wir sie überblicken und 
aneinander messen können, und zwar 
deshalb, weil wir selbst in einer 
Ordnung leben.7 (Waldenfels 1987: 
164)
In face of other cultures the Europeans 
have not been conscious of their position 
taking and viewed the accomplishments 
from other cultures as stages of 
development reaching what the European 
have accomplished. Waldenfels 
characterizes this attitude as 
"Eurocentrism." (Waldenfels 1993: 61) But 
whence comes the “Eurocentrism”? With 
help of the Husserlian notions, which we 
also mentioned earlier, i.e., the notions of 
homeworld and alienworld Waldenfels 
tries to find an answer by posing the 
following question: How do the 
homeworld and the alienworld relate to 
each other? He explains that Husserl, on 
the one hand, recognizes the essential 
difference between homeworld and 
alienworld, but on the other he excludes 
this difference by introducing the idea of 
“one world for all.” This world is common 
to homeworld and alienworld and gives all 
experiences the first ground (erster Grund) 
and the last horizon (letzter Horizon). The 
instrument for setting up this grounding 
level of meaning is reason (Vernunft). 
Europe is for Husserl a geographical name 
for reason itself, for a comprehensive form 
of rationality. Europe understands itself as 
"the guardian of the common world" 
(Vorhut einer Gemeinwelt) that is to be 
characterized by universality. The 
Europeans have created the standards and 
ideals for all cultures, which creation also 
manifests their right belief and right reason. 
                                                
7 “Selective orders are incomparable in a radical 
sense: we are wanting in a position, from which we 
can glance over them and compare them, just 
because we ourselves live in a certain order.” (my 
own translation) 
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(Waldenfels 1993: 61) Measured by this 
standard, all the accomplishments of other 
cultures can be seen to be the pre-logical, 
pre-rational or to put it directly, barbarian, 
pagan, or primitive. If their 
accomplishments are not to be eliminated 
in the history of reason (Vernuftgeschichte), 
the non-European could at least learn from 
the European and become European. (Hua 
VI: 320) To this Eurocentrism Waldenfels 
comments:
Dieser Eurozentrismus bringt das 
Wunder fertig, mit dem Eigenen zu 
beginnen, durch das Fremde 
hindurchzugehen, um schließlich 
beim Ganzen zu enden.8 (Waldenfels 
1993: 61)
By such rational overcoming of otherness 
(Fremdheit) involved in the non-European 
cultures, the Europeans lose sight of 
otherness, and Waldenfels holds this 
blindness of otherness to be a considerable 
deficiency in European culture. He finds it 
questionable to treat the European order as 
the only order and suggests that the other 
cultures could construct their own 
standards and ideals and integrate the 
accomplishments of the European as part 
of their orders.9
IV
How is the rejection of the idea of 
grounding related to our topic? What could 
the new conception look like concerning 
the relationship between lifeworld and 
cultural difference without the idea of 
grounding?
    Should we say that no lifeworld is 
universally valid for all cultures? Or 
instead, it is still meaningful to speak of 
universality in spite of differences between 
cultures? Waldenfels points out, the idea of 
universality is not at all undesirable as long 
                                                
8 “This Eurocentrism brings about wonder, 
beginning from the ownness, going through the 
otherness, and eventually ending in totality.” (my 
own translation) 
9 Waldenfels tentatively explicates this idea by 
introducing a dialogue between two religious 
leaders from Judaism and Buddhism. (1993: 63)
as we may assume the paradox of 
“universalization in plural” 
(Universalisierung im Plural) (Waldenfels 
1993: 63), according to which no culture 
could claim to have created the order. 
Based on this understanding of universality, 
what is universal does not necessarily 
imply the idea of grounding. If universality 
is a result by universalization and without 
exception yielded in a certain culture, it 
cannot but remain contextual. If we see 
that every culture has its way of 
universalization and its idea of universality, 
there is no reason why this way of 
universalization should be rejected and its 
idea of universality be not recognized. By 
way of mutual recognition of universality 
we could avoid the naïve understanding 
that only they or we have created the true
order of universalization. 
    In the age of globalization we seem to 
be marching toward a common world with 
universally accepted norms and values. But 
should globalization be realized at the price 
of cultural differences? If the globalization 
is desirable, should it be the result of 
conquering rather than mutual recognition 
and understanding? Should not different 
cultures learn from each other rather than 
impose their ideas on each other? These 
are questions that obviously deserve 
further investigations and reflections.
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